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Abstract— Recently Lin et al. proposed a method of using
the underdetermined BSS (blind source separation) problem to
realize image and speech encryption. In this paper, we give a
cryptanalysis of this BSS-based encryption and point out that it
is not secure against known/chosen-plaintext attack and chosen-
ciphertext attack. In addition, there exist some other security
defects: low sensitivity to part of the key and the plaintext,
a ciphertext-only differential attack, divide-and-conquer (DAC)
attack on part of the key. We also discuss the role of BSS in Lin
et al.’s efforts towards cryptographically secure ciphers.
Index Terms— blind source separation (BSS), speech encryp-
tion, image encryption, cryptanalysis, known-plaintext attack,
chosen-plaintext attack, chosen-ciphertext attack, differential
attack, divide-and-conquer (DAC) attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of multimedia and networking
technologies, the security of multimedia data becomes more
and more important in many real applications. To fulfill such
an increasing demand, during past decades many encryption
schemes have been proposed to protect multimedia data,
including speech, images and videos [1]–[9].
According to the nature of protected data, multimedia
encryption schemes can be classified into two basic types:
analog and digital. Most early schemes were designed to
encrypt analog data in various ways: element permuting, signal
masking, frequency shuffling, etc., all of which may be exerted
in time domain or transform domain or both. However, due
to the simplicity of the encryption procedures, almost all
analog encryption schemes are not sufficiently secure against
cryptographical attacks, especially those modern attacks such
as known/chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext attacks [2],
[3], [10], [11]. As a comparison, in digital encryption schemes,
one can employ any cryptographically strong cipher, such
as DES [12] or AES [13], to achieve a higher level of
security. Besides, to achieve a higher efficiency of encryption
and some special demands of multimedia encryption (such
as format-compliance [14] and perceptual encryption [15]),
many specific multimedia encryption schemes have also been
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developed [4]–[6]. Recent cryptanalysis work [16]–[30] has
shown that some multimedia encryption schemes are insecure
against various cryptographical attacks.
Recently Lin et al. suggested employing blind source sepa-
ration (BSS) for the purpose of image and speech encryption
[31]–[37]. The basic idea is to mix multiple plaintexts (or mul-
tiple segments of the same plaintext) with a number of secret
key signals, in the hope that an attacker has to solve a hard
mathematical problem – the underdetermined BSS problem. In
Sec. VII of [37], Lin et al. claimed that this BSS-based cipher
“is immune from the attacks such as the ciphertext-only attack,
the known-plaintext, and the chosen-plaintext attack”, “as long
as the intractability of the underdetermined BSS problem is
guaranteed by the mixing matrix for encryption”.
This paper re-evaluates the security of the BSS-based en-
cryption scheme and points out that it is actually insecure
against known/chosen-plaintext attack and chosen-ciphertext
attack. In addition, some other security defects are also found
under the ciphertext-only attacking scenario, including the low
sensitivity to the mixing matrix (part of the secret key) and
the plaintext, and a differential attack that works well when
the matrix size is small. Based on the cryptanalytic findings,
we also discuss the role of BSS in Lin et al.’s efforts towards
cryptographically secure ciphers.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In next section
we give a brief introduction to the BSS-based encryption
scheme. Section III is the main body of this paper and focuses
on the cryptanalysis of the BSS-based encryption scheme.
Then, the role of BSS in cryptography is discussed in Sec. IV.
Finally the last section concludes this paper.
II. BSS-BASED ENCRYPTION
Blind source separation is a technique that tries to recover
a set of unobserved sources or signals from observed mixtures
[38]. Given N unobserved signals s1, · · · , sN and a mixing
matrix A of size N × M , the BSS problem is to recover
s1, · · · , sN from M observed signals x1, · · · ,xM , where
[x1, · · · ,xM ]T = A[s1, · · · , sN ]T . (1)
When M ≥ N , the blind source separation is possible when
A satisfies some requirements. However, when M < N , this
is generally impossible (whatever A is), thus leading to the
underdetermined BSS problem.
In [31]–[37], Lin et al. introduced a number of secret key
signals to make the determination of the plaintext signals
become an underdetermined BSS problem in the case that
the key signals are unknown. Given P input plain-signals
2s1(t), · · · , sP (t) and Q key signals k1(t), · · · , kQ(t), the
encryption procedure is described as follows1:
x(t) = [x1(t), · · · , xP (t)]T = Ask(t), (2)
where x(t) denote P cipher-signals, sk(t) =
[s1(t), · · · , sP (t), k1(t), · · · , kQ(t)]T , and A is a P×(P+Q)
mixing matrix whose elements are within in [−1, 1]. Assume
that A = [As,Ak], where As is a P × P matrix and Ak
is a P × Q matrix. Then, the encryption procedure can be
represented in an equivalent form:
x(t) = Ass(t) +Akk(t), (3)
where s(t) = [s1(t), · · · , sP (t)]T and k(t) =
[k1(t), · · · , kQ(t)]T . Thus, as long as As is an invertible
matrix, one can decrypt s(t) as follows2:
s(t) = A−1s (x(t)−Akk(t)) . (4)
Different values of Q was used in Lin et al.’s papers: Q = 1
in [31] and Q = P in [32]–[37]. When Q = P , Lin et al.
further set As = B and Ak = βB, where β ≥ 10 for image
encryption and β ≥ 1 for speech encryption. In this case, the
encryption procedure becomes
x(t) = B (s(t) + βk(t)) , (5)
and the decryption procedure becomes
s(t) = B−1x(t)− βk(t). (6)
Observing Eq. (3), one can see that the encryption procedure
contains two steps:
• Step 1: x(1)(t) = Ass(t);
• Step 2: x(t) = x(1)(t) +Akk(t).
The first step corresponds to a substitution (block) cipher, and
the second step corresponds to a additive stream cipher. From
another point of view, the two steps are exchanged as follows:
• Step 1: x(1)(t) = s(t) +A−1s Akk(t);
• Step 2: x(t) = Asx(1)(t).
In any case, the BSS-based encryption scheme is always a
product cipher composed by a simple block cipher and an
additive stream cipher. In next section, we will show that the
two sub-ciphers can be separately broken by known/chosen-
plaintext attack and chosen-ciphertext attack.
In the BSS-based encryption scheme, the key signals
k1(t), · · · , kQ(t) are as long as the plain-signals and have to
be generated by a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG)
with a secret seed I0, which serves as the secret key. In Lin
et al.’s papers, it was not explicitly mentioned whether or not
the mixing matrix should be used as part of the secret key.
However, if the attacker knows A, the product cipher degrades
to be a stream cipher. Considering x∗(t) = A−1s x(t) as the
equivalent cipher-signal, the encryption procedure becomes
x
∗(t) = s(t) +A−1s Akk(t). (7)
1To achieve a clearer description of the BSS-based encryption scheme, in
this paper we use some notations different from those in Lin et al.’s original
papers. For example, in [37], the i-th key signal is denoted by sni(t), while
in this paper we use ki(t) to emphasize the fact that it is a key signal.
2In Lin et al.’s papers, it is said that the decryption procedure was
achieved via BSS. However, from the cryptographical point of view, it is
more convenient to denote the decryption procedure by Eq. (4).
In this case, the encryption scheme is actually independent
of the underdetermined BSS problem. In addition, as we
shown later in Sec. III-A.5, the key signals can be totally
circumvented in a ciphertext-only differential attack, so the
mixing matrix A must be kept as the secret key. Thus, in this
paper we assume that the secret key consists of both I0 and
A.
In [31]–[35], the BSS-based encryption scheme was mainly
designed to encrypt P images simultaneously, where si(t) is
the t-th pixel in the i-th image. In [36], [37], the encryption
scheme was suggested to encrypt a single speech, each frame
of which is divided into P segments and si(t) is the t-th
sample in the i-th segment. This encryption scheme can also
be applied for a single image, by dividing it into P blocks
of the same size. To facilitate the following discussion, we
assume that the encryption scheme is used to encrypt a single
plaintext with P segments of equal size.
In Sec. VII of [37], Lin et al. claimed that the BSS-
based encryption scheme is secure against most modern cryp-
tographical attacks, including the ciphertext-only attack, the
known-plaintext attack, and the chosen-plaintext attack. In
next section we will show that this claim is problematic.
III. CRYPTANALYSIS
Before introducing the cryptanalytic results, let us see how
large the key space is. In Lin et al.’s papers, each element of A
is within the interval [−1, 1]. Then, assuming that each element
in A has R possible values3, the number of all possible mixing
matrix A is RP (P+Q). Furthermore, assuming that the bit size
of I0 is L, the size of the whole key space is RP (P+Q)2L.
When Q = P and A = [B, βB], the size of the whole key
space is RP 22L. Later we will show that the real size of the
key space is much smaller than this estimation, due to some
essential security defects of the BSS-based encryption scheme.
We will also point out that the encryption scheme under
study is not secure against known/chosen-plaintext attack and
chosen-ciphertext attack.
A. Ciphertext-Only Attack
1) Divide-and-Conquer (DAC) Attack: Rewriting Eq. (4) in
the following form:
s(t) = Aˆxk(t), (8)
where xk(t) = [x1(t), · · · , xP (t), k1(t), · · · , kQ(t)]T and
Aˆ = A−1s [I,−Ak] =
[
A
−1
s ,−A−1s Ak
]
.
From the above equation, to recover xi(t), one only needs to
know k(t) and the i-th row of Aˆ. In other words, when the
BSS-based encryption scheme is used to encrypt P indepen-
dent plaintexts, the i-th plaintext can be exactly recovered with
the knowledge of I0 and the i-th row of Aˆ. A similar result
3The value of R is determined by the finite precision under which the
cryptosystem is realized. For example, if the cryptosystem is implemented
with n-bit fixed-point arithmetic, R = 2n; if it is implemented with IEEE
floating-point arithmetic, R ≈ 231 (single-precision) or R ≈ 263 (double-
precision) [39], where note that the sign bit of the floating-point number is
always negative.
3can be obtained when P segments of one single plaintext is
encrypted with the encryption scheme. This fact means that
P rows of Aˆ can be separately broken with a divide-and-
conquer (DAC) attack. As a result, the size of the key space is
reduced to be PR(P+Q)2L. When Q = P and A = [B, βB],
it becomes PRP 2L.
2) Low Sensitivity to A: From the cryptographical point of
view, given two distinct keys, even if their difference is the
minimal value under the current finite precision, the encryption
and decryption results of a good cryptosystem should still
be completely different. In other words, this cryptosystem
should have a very high sensitivity to the secret key [12].
Unfortunately, the BSS-based encryption scheme does not
satisfy this security principle, because the involved matrix
computation is not sufficiently sensitive to matrix mismatch.
Given two matrices A1 and A2 of size M×N , if the maximal
difference of all elements is ε, then one can easily deduce
that each element of |A1s(t) − A2s(t)| is not greater than
N max(s(t))ε. As a result, the matrix A can be approxi-
mately guessed under a relatively large finite precision ε, still
maintaining an acceptable quality of the recovered plaintexts.
This immediately leads to a significant reduction of the size of
the key space: from PR(P+Q)2L to P ⌈2/ε⌉(P+Q)2L, where
⌈2/ε⌉(P+Q) ≪ R(P+Q).
The above low sensitivity can be easily verified with exper-
iments described as follows:
• Step 1: for a randomly-generated key (A, I0), calculate
the ciphertext x(t) corresponding to a plaintext s(t);
• Step 2: with another mismatched key (A + εR, I0),
decrypt x(t) to get s˜(t) – an estimated version of s(t),
where ε ∈ (0, 1) and R is a P×(P+Q) random (1,−1)-
matrix.
For each value of ε, the second step was repeated for 100
times to get a mean value of the recovery error (measured
in MAE – mean absolute error)4. Then, we can observe the
relationship between the recovery error and the value of ε.
Figure 1 shows the experimental results when the plaintexts
are a digital image and a speech file, respectively.
The experimental results confirms that a mismatched key
can approximately recover the plaintext. Considering that
humans have a good capability of resisting errors in images
and speech, even relatively large errors may not be able to
prevent a human attacker from recognizing the plain-image or
plain-speech. Thus, the value of ε may be relatively large.
When P = 4, A = [B, βB] and ε = 0.1, we give two
examples of such recognizable plaintexts with relatively large
errors in Figs. 2 and 3.
From the above experimental results, we can exhaustively
search for an approximate version of A under the finite
precision ε = 0.01 ∼ 0.1. Such an approximate version of
A is then used to roughly reveal the plaintext. Considering
the searching complexity is O
(
ε−(P+Q)
)
, such an exhaustive
search is feasible when P,Q is not very large5. When P =
4When the plaintext is a digital image with 256 gray scales, we first calibrate
each sub-image into the range {0, · · · , 255} and then calculate the recovery
error of the whole image.
5In [31]–[37], small values are used in all examples: P = 2 or 4 and
Q ≤ P .
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Legend: ∗ – P = Q = 4; ◦ – P = 4 and A = [B, βB]
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Fig. 1. The experimental relationship between the recovery error and the
value of ε: a) the plaintext is a digital image “Lenna” (Fig. 3a); b) the plaintext
is a speech file “one.wav” that corresponds to the pronunciation of the English
word “one” (from Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com).
2 and A = [B, βB], we carried out a large number of
experiments in the following steps:
• Step 1: for a randomly-generated key (B, I0), calculate
the ciphertext x(t) corresponding to a plaintext s(t);
• Step 2: randomly generate a matrix R (each element
over the interval [−1, 1]), and then decrypt x(t) with the
guessed key (R, I0) to get s˜(t);
• Step 3: repeat Step 2 for r rounds, output the recovered
plaintext s˜∗(t), every segment of which corresponds to
the best recovery performance in all the r rounds;
• Step 4: for the i-th segment of s˜∗(t), find the correspond-
ing matrix R, extract its i-th row of its inverse R−1 to
form the i-th row of B˜
−1
, the inverse of an estimation
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Fig. 2. An example of human capability against large noises in
speech. From top to bottom: the original plain-speech “one.wav”,
the recovered speech, the recovery error (MAE=0.164103).
For reader’s sake, the recovered speech is posted online at
http://www.hooklee.com/Papers/Data/BSSE/one MAE=0.164103.wav.
a) b)
Fig. 3. An example of human capability against large noises in images: a)
the original plain-image “Lenna”; b) the recovered image (MAE=47.6913).
of the original matrix B.
Assuming that the target finite precision is ε > 0, the interval
[−1, 1] is divided into nε = ⌈2/ε⌉ sub-intervals. Without
loss of generality, assuming that 2/ε is an integer, then each
sub-interval is of equal size. Thus, if the element in the
random matrix R has a uniform distribution over [−1, 1], the
probability that |ri,j − ai,j | < ε occurs at least one time in r
rounds of experiment is p(nε, r) = 1−(1−1/nε)r, where ri,j
and ai,j are the (i, j)-th elements of R and A, respectively.
One can easily deduce that p(nε, r) is an increasing function
with respect to r and
p(nε, nε) > lim
nε→∞
p(nε, nε) = 1− lim
nε→∞
(1− 1/nε)nε
= 1− e−1 ≈ 0.6321,
which leads to the result that p(nε, r) > 1 − e−1 when r ≥
nε. In other words, with r ≥ nε experiments, it is a high-
probability event that we have at least one ri,j “equal” to ai,j
under the finite precision ε. To get an approximate estimation
of the i-th row of A, we can see that r = O
(
nPε
)
rounds of
experiment are needed.
Apparently, the above steps actually simulate the process of
a real ciphertext-only attack that tries to reveal the plaintext
and to exhaustively guess B−1 (under the assumption that
I0 has been known). Note that MAE cannot be calculated to
evaluate the recovery performance in a real attack, in which
one does not know the plaintext. Fortunately, exploiting the
large information redundancy existing in natural images and
speech, one can turn to use some other measures to reflect
the recovery performance of each segment of s˜(t). In our
experiments, we use a measure called MANE (mean absolute
neighboring error), which is defined as follows for the i-th
segment of s˜(t)
1
T − 2
T−1∑
t=2
|s˜i(t)− s˜i(t− 1)|+ |s˜i(t)− s˜i(t+ 1)|
2
, (9)
where T denotes the segment length. In Figs. 4 and 5, one
recovered plain-speech and two recovered plain-images are
shown for demonstration. One can see that r = O(10, 000)
(or ε ≈ 0.01) is sufficient to get a good estimation of the
plaintext.
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Fig. 4. A recovered speech in one 50,000-round experiment of
exhaustively guessing A when P = 2 and A = [B, βB].
From top to bottom: the original plain-speech “one.wav”, the recov-
ered speech (MANE of each segment: 0.0469, 0.0521), the recov-
ery error. For reader’s sake, the recovered speech is posted online at
http://www.hooklee.com/Papers/Data/BSSE/one MANE=0.0469-0.0521.wav.
Note that for 2-D images the above 1-D MANE may be
generalized to include more neighboring pixels, thus achieving
a more accurate description of the recovery performance.
In addition, multiple quality factors can be employed to
further increase the efficiency of evaluation of the recovery
performance.
3) Low Sensitivity to k(t): Due to the same reason of
the low sensitivity to A, one can deduce that the BSS-based
encryption scheme is also insensitive to the key signal k(t).
Given two key signals k1(t) and k2(t), if the maximal differ-
ence of all elements is ε, each element of |Akk1(t)−Akk2(t)|
is not greater than Qmax(|Ak|)ε = Qε. Since k(t) itself is
not part of the secret key, but generated from I0, this problem
5a) b)
Fig. 5. Two recovered plain-images in our experiments of exhaustively
guessing B when P = 2 and A = [B, βB]: a) r = 1, 000 (MANE of
each segment: 39.7491, 14.9373); b) r = 10, 000 (MANE of each segment:
16.3888, 15.1722).
does not have much negative influence on the security of the
whole cryptosystem against ciphertext-only attacks.
4) Low Sensitivity to Plaintext: Another cryptographical
property required by a good cryptosystem is that the encryp-
tion is very sensitive to plaintext, i.e., the ciphertexts of two
plaintexts with a slight difference should be much different
[12]. However, this property does not hold for the BSS-based
encryption scheme. Given two key signals s1(t) and s2(t), if
the maximal difference of all elements is ε, each element of
|Ass1(t)−Ass2(t)| is not greater than P max(|As|)ε = Pε.
When the same secret key is used to encrypt two close-
correlated plaintexts, such as a plaintext and its watermarked
version, this security defect means that the exposure of one
plaintext leads to the revealment of both.
5) Differential Attack: Given two plaintexts s(1)(t) and
s
(2)(t), if they are encrypted with the same key (A, I0), we
can get the following formula from Eq. (3):
∆x(t) = As∆s(t), (10)
where ∆x(t) = x(1)(t)−x(2)(t) and ∆s(t) = s(1)(t)−s(2)(t).
Note that Akk(t) disappears in the above equation. This
means that from the differential viewpoint only As is the
secret key, i.e., I0 is removed from the key. Considering the
low sensitivity of the encryption scheme to A, under finite
precision ε the key space becomes O
(
Pε−P
)
, and one might
exhaustively search As to recover the plaintext differential as
follows:
∆s(t) = A
−1
s ∆x(t). (11)
From the obtained plaintext differential, one can get a mixed
view of the two interested plaintexts, from which both plain-
texts may be completely recognizable by humans. See Figs. 6
and 7 for four plaintext differentials of two speech files and
two images.
Denoting the guessed matrix by A˜s, we have
∆˜s(t) = A˜
−1
s ∆x(t) = A˜
−1
s As∆s(t). (12)
Apparently, if A˜s 6= As, the obtained plaintext differential
∆˜s(t) will have an inter-segment mixture, which may make the
recognition of the two plaintexts more difficult. Fortunately,
when P is relatively small, such an inter-segment mixture
may not be too severe to prevent the recognition of the
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
−0.5
0
0.5
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
−0.5
0
0.5
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
−0.5
0
0.5
Fig. 6. Differentials of two plain-speech files. From top to bottom: the first
speech “one.wav”, the second speech “two.wav”, the differential one-two, the
differential two-one. For readers’ sake, the two differential speech files are
posted online at http://www.hooklee.com/Papers/Data/BSSE/one-two.wav and
http://www.hooklee.com/Papers/Data/BSSE/two-one.wav.
a) b)
Fig. 7. Differentials of two plain-images, “Lenna” and “cameraman”: a)
Lenna-cameraman; b) cameraman-Lenna.
two plaintexts by humans. More importantly, our experiments
showed that humans can even be able to recognize the two
plaintexts even when the mismatch between A˜s and As is
not very small. When P = 2,
As =
[
0.7123 −0.4272
0.1958 0.1295
]
, A˜s =
[
0.5914 0.9527
0.5726 0.1437
]
, (13)
a plaintext differential obtained in our experiments is shown
in Fig. 8. One can see that both plain-images, “Lenna” and
“cameraman”, can still be roughly recognized from such
a heavily mixed differential. Another obtained plain-speech
differential for “one.wav” and “two.wav”, is shown in Fig. 9,
from which the two English words (“one” and “two”) are also
perceptible.
In this differential attack, the quality evaluation factors (such
as MANE) used in Sec. III-A.2 is not suitable to automatically
determine the best result in many plaintext differentials, be-
cause each segment of the obtained plaintext differential is
also a natural signal with abundant information redundancy.
Instead, one has to output all obtained differentials, and check
them with naked eyes or ears to find a perceptually-optimal
6Fig. 8. One obtained plain-image differential when As and A˜s have a
relatively large mismatch as shown in Eq. (13).
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
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Fig. 9. One obtained plain-speech differential when As and A˜s have
a relatively large mismatch. For readers’ sake, this differential speech is
posted online at http://www.hooklee.com/Papers/Data/BSSE/two-one-large-
mismatch.wav.
a) b)
Fig. 10. A visually-optimal result obtained in 100 plain-image differentials:
a) the differential; b) the negative image of the differential.
result with the least inter-segment mixture. Figure 10 shows
such a result in 100 plain-image differentials when P = 2 and
A follows Eq. (13). By checking each segment separately and
combine the P optimal segments together, one can further get
a better result with less inter-segment mixture.
While this differential attack works well for P = 2 as shown
above, it will become infeasible when P is sufficiently large,
due to the following facts: 1) the inter-segment mixture is too
severe; 2) the complexity of checking all O (ε−P ) differentials
is beyond humans’ capability.
B. Known-Plaintext Attack
In this kind of attack, one can access to a number of
plaintexts that are encrypted with the same key. Then, from
Eq. (10), with P plaintext differentials, one immediately
knows that the mixing matrix can be uniquely determined as
follows:
As = ∆X(t)(∆S(t))
−1, (14)
where ∆S(t) and ∆X(t) are P ×P matrices, constructed row
by row from the P plaintext differentials and the correspond-
ing ciphertext differentials, respectively. Then, Akk(t) can be
further solved from any plaintext and its ciphertext:
Akk(t) = x(t)−Ass(t). (15)
Now, (As,Akk(t)) can be used to recover other plaintexts
encrypted by the same key (A, I0). Note that Akk(t) has a
finite length determined by the maximal length of all known
plaintexts, so (As,Akk(t)) can only recover plaintexts under
this finite length.
When A = [B, βB], the key signals can also be determined:
k(t) =
s(t)−B−1x(t)
β
. (16)
If the PRNG used is not cryptographically strong (such as
LFSR [12]), it may be possible to further derive the secret
seed I0, thus completely breaking the BSS-based encryption
scheme.
Note that n distinct plaintexts can generate
(
n
2
)
= n(n −
1)/2 plaintext differentials. Solving the inequality n(n −
1)/2 ≥ P , one can get the number of required plaintexts to
yield at least P plaintext differentials:
n ≥
⌈√
P − 1/4 + 1/2
⌉
≈
√
P . (17)
C. Chosen-Plaintext/Ciphertext Attack
In chosen-plaintext attack, one can freely choose a number
of plaintexts and observe the corresponding ciphertexts, while
in chosen-ciphertext attack, one can freely choose a number
of ciphertexts and observe the corresponding plaintexts. So in
these attacks, one can choose P plaintext differentials easily,
which means that the above differential known-plaintext attack
still works in the same way.
IV. DISCUSSION
As we pointed out in last section, the BSS-based encryption
scheme is always insecure against plaintext attack. So the
secret key cannot be repeatedly used in any case. This means
that the encryption scheme has to work like a common stream
cipher, by changing the secret key for each distinct plaintext.
However, in this case, k(t) (equivalently, the secret seed I0) is
enough to provide a high level of security, since k(t) satisfies
the cryptographical properties in a perfectly secure one-time-
a-pad cipher (see Sec. V.B of [37]). Then, the mixing matrix
A becomes excessive.
Even when one wants to add a second defense to potential
attacks by applying the BSS mixing, the low sensitivity of
encryption/decryption to the mixing matrix A (recall Sec. III-
A.2) makes this goal less useful. As a result, with the current
encryption design, the BSS model does not play a key role
in the security of the scheme. The real core of the encryption
scheme is the embedded PRNG that is in charge of generating
the key signals masking the plaintexts.
If one wants to use the BSS-based encryption scheme with
repeatedly used key, some essential modifications have to
be made to reinforce the security against various attacks.
7Following the cryptanalytic results given in last section, we
suggest adopting two coutermeasures simultaneously: 1) use a
sufficiently large P ; 2) like the design of most modern block
ciphers [12], iterate the BSS-based encryption for many rounds
to avoid the original scheme’s low sensitivity to the secret
key and plaintext. It is obvious that both countermeasures
will significantly influence the encryption/decryption speed of
the encryption scheme. It seems doubtful if such an enhanced
encryption scheme will have any advantages compared with
other multiple-round block ciphers, especially AES [13] that
can be optimized to run with a very high rate on PCs [40].
Finally, it deserve mentioning that the original BSS-based
encryption scheme can be used to realize lossy decryption,
an interesting feature that may find useful in some real
applications6. This feature means that an encryption scheme
can still (maybe roughly) recover the plaintext even when there
are some errors in the ciphertexts. An typical use of this feature
is that the ciphertext can be compressed with some lossy
algorithms to save the required storage in local computers
or the channel width for transmission. For the BSS-based
encryption scheme, the lossy decryption feature is ensured
by low sensitivity of decryption to ciphertext, which is due
to the same reason of the low sensitivity of encryption to
plaintext (recall Sec. III-A.4). However, keep in mind that the
lossy decryption feature is induced by the low sensitivity to
plaintext/ciphertext, so there is a tradeoff between this feature
and security.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper analyzes the security of an image/speech encryp-
tion scheme based on BSS mixing technology [31]–[37]. It has
been shown that this BSS-based encryption scheme suffers
from some security defects, including its vulnerability to a
ciphertext-only differential attack, known/chosen-plaintext at-
tack and chosen-ciphertext attack. It remains an open problem
how to apply BSS technology to construct cryptographically
strong ciphers.
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